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MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE: THE ENDLESS
DISPOSAL OF AMERICAN
MUNICIPALITIES MEETS THE CERCLA
STRICT LIABILITY DRAGON
Norman A. Dupont *
"They were careless people, Tom and Daisy-they smashed up
things and creatures and then retreated back into their money or
their vast carelessness.., and let other people clean up the mess
they had made ..... 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Like the wealthy elite of F. Scott Fitzgerald's Long Island world of
leisure, Americans have been among the world's most careless people.
Americans produce an enormous amount of "solid" or "household"
waste, also known as municipal solid waste (MSW).2 Indeed, some
sources suggest that Americans are much more extravagant in their dis-
posal of MSW than citizens in comparably affluent foreign countries.3
Regardless of America's comparative extravagance, the simple fact is
that even on an absolute basis, Americans consume and then throw away
an enormous amount of materials. One estimate is that every American
* Norman A. Dupont is a partner at Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker in Los Angeles
where he practices in the field of environmental law. He received a B.A. from Stanford Uni-
versity in 1975, and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center in 1978.
1. F. Scor FrrZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 158 (1925) (emphasis added).
2. As in any field, one finds a variety of terms for the same basic concept. This Article
will use Municipal Solid Waste (MSW) to include municipal garbage collected from house-
holds. MSW may also include various sludges or materials from light industrial or commercial
sources. For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has defined
MSW as "solid waste generated primarily by households, but may include some contribution
of wastes from commercial, institutional and industrial sources as well." EPA Interim Munic-
ipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071, 51,074 (1989) [hereinafter EPA Interim Policy];
see also B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 968-71 (D. Conn. 1991) (describing
various municipal waste streams, including "bulky waste" from Town of Woodbury as includ-
ing "tires and wastes from the maintenance, construction or demolition of residential, indus-
trial or commercial structures," or sludge from the Town of Beacon Falls' wastewater
treatment plant).
3. See, eg., Kovacs, The Coming Era of Conservation and Industrial Utilization of Re-
cyclable Materials, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 537, 538-39 n.7 (1988) (citing evidence of massive vol-
ume of solid wastes generated by U.S.; noting that U.S. generates two and one-half times more
municipal waste per capita than either Japan or West Germany).
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is responsible for creating between 2.5 and 4.0 pounds of MSW per day.4
Californians alone throw away 202 million pounds of waste every day.5
Until recently, the enormous output of MSW by Americans was not
perceived as a potential limitation upon the growth of American urban
or even rural areas. Landfills, mistakenly known as "sanitary landfills,"
were perceived as a cheap and available dumping ground for such wastes.
One author boldly stated that such landfills: "minimize environmental
hazards by depositing refuse in a natural or man-made depression, com-
pacting it, and covering it ....
Two problems pertaining to the availability of environmentally safe
waste disposal methods, however, have arisen, suggesting that there are
substantial costs associated with the explosive growth of American urban
society. One problem is the discovery that the "sanitary landfill" is sim-
ply not sanitary.7 In all too many cases, the old "sanitary landfill" has
proven to be a leaking pit-a source of potentially explosive methane gas
and hazardous leachates.8 A second, and more recent problem, is that
the unchecked accumulation of MSW in landfills can expose municipali-
ties to potentially disastrous liability under the ultimate environmental
liability statute-the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).9
4. Ferrey, The Toxic Time Bomb: Municipal Liability for the Cleanup of Hazardous
Waste, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 197, 200-01 (1988). Professor Ferrey's article is a comprehen-
sive and thoughtful introduction to the entire subject of MSW and its legal treatment by the
EPA.
5. Cone, Cities' Tactics Vary in the War Against Waste, L.A. Times, Mar. 22, 1991, at B1,
col. 5.
6. Comment, Municipal Solid Waste Regulation: An Ineffective Solution to a National
Problem, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 215, 217 (1982). Landfilling waste is such a common means
of disposal that, in Los Angeles County for example, "many [landfills] reach their daily ton-
nage limits so early in the day that they have to shut down by noon." Cone, supra note 5, at
B1, ol. 5.
7. Kovacs, supra note 3, at 541 (operating landfills, particularly those built before 1980,
"pose significant health and environmental risks").
8. Note, Municipal Solid Waste Management: The State Must Pick Up Where Congress
Left Off, 23 AKRON L. REV. 587, 589 (1990) ("Methane gas, generated by decomposition of
garbage, can collect in nearby buildings and eventually cause explosions. Leachite, a liquid
containing waste bacteria and other contaminants, can drain out of landfills and contaminate
the surface and ground water.").
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988). CERCLA is also known as the "Superfund." Mosko-
witz & Hoyt, Enforcement of CERCLA Against Innocent Owners of Property, 19 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 1171, 1171 (1986). A description of the vast liability imposed by CERCLA can be found
in a recent First Circuit opinion, United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp.:
The Act empowers the government to use money from the "superfund" to clean up
hazardous waste sites. Any "person" who is the "owner" or "operator" of a facility
at the time of the disposal of a hazardous substance shall be liable for, among other
things, all of the costs of removal or other remedial action incurred by the United
States. Liability for the cost incurred is strict and joint and several.
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This Article focuses on the second area-the potential liability of
cities under CERCLA. In two recent cases involving critical urban ar-
eas-the Northeast and California-United States district courts have
reached a common conclusion. 0 That conclusion, simply stated, is that
despite the exemption of MSW1 I from the strict regulatory provisions of
the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 12 munici-
palities can still be held liable under CERCLA for the MSW which they
generate and send to landfills.13 The district courts' conclusions, while
long expected by some, 4 spell out in elaborate detail that cities are faced
with a new and potentially severe economic limit on their production of
"plain old trash."
This Article first sets forth the legal framework for treatment of
MSW. Next, it examines the decisions of the two recent federal cases
rejecting the municipal argument that MSW is exempt as a matter of law
from CERCLA liability. Finally, this Article analyzes certain proposals
municipalities may consider when planning for their growth and the in-
evitable production of garbage that ensues from that growth.
910 F.2d 24, 26(1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991); accord 1
C. SCHRAFF & R. STEINBERG, RCRA AND SUPERFUND: A PRAcTncE GUIDE wrrH FORMS
§ 2.01, at 2-2 (1988) ("Virtually every court that has considered the issue has concluded that
CERCLA imposes a standard of strict liability, and provides joint and several liability among
responsible parties when two or more persons have contributed to a single indivisible harm.
Moreover, courts have imposed a minimal causation standard."). The liability provision dis-
cussed in Kayser-Roth Corp. is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
This imposition of "strict" and "joint and several" liability under CERCLA constitutes
an awesome threat, particularly given that environmental clean-up costs often average in the
tens of millions of dollars. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS, OTA-
ITA-362, ARE WE CLEAMNG UP? 10 SUPERFUND CASE STUDIES--SPECIAL REPORT 1, 5-7
(1988) (noting estimated cleanup costs of city landfills: Smithfield, R.I., $28 million; Niagara
Falls, N.Y., $30 million; Monterey Park, Cal., $4.8 million; N. Dartmouth, Mass., $19.9 mil-
lion; Seymour, Ind., $18 million); Wright, Advantages and Disadvantages ofLandfilling, MUN.
ATrry, Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 7, 9 (noting cost of clean-up of Seattle landfill is in $40 million
range with long-term costs undetermined).
10. See B.F Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 960; Transportation Leasing Co. v. California,
No. 89-7368, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
11. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4 (1990).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907, 6911-6916, 6921-6931, 6941-6949, 6951-6954, 6961-6964,
6971-6979, 6981-6986 (1988).
13. B.F Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 974; Transportation Leasing Co., No. 89-7368, slip
op. at 5.
14. See EPA Interim Policy, supra note 2, at 51,074 (CERCLA "does not provide an
exemption from liability for municipalities."); Ferrey, supra note 4, at 263-65 (arguing that
MSW is considered hazardous substance under CERCLA, regardless of any exemption for
that material under RCRA); Wright, supra note 9, at 8 ("Several years ago after amendments
to Superfund, it became apparent that sanitary landfilling represented a liability, not only to
the environment but to the economic stability of some communities because the potential lia-
bilities for the operation of a landfill under Superfund are unprecedented in this country.").
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II. WHY HAZARDOUS? WHEREFORE REGULATED? THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S TRADITIONAL
NON-REGULATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE
Like scheming Edmund's protest over society labelling him "base"
due to the illegitimate nature of his conception,"5 many municipalities
have wondered why society labels their MSW with the opprobrious term
"hazardous." 16 To answer this query, it is important to briefly review
the current status of MSW under RCRA-the most pervasive federal
statute regulating ground disposal of wastes. RCRA constituted a set of
amendments 7 to the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), 18 but its im-
pact on and changes to that act have been so pervasive that the amend-
ments swallowed the SWDA, and most commentators and practitioners
simply refer to the current statute as RCRA. 19
RCRA divided the world of waste into two basic classes: the non-
hazardous and the hazardous.20 As the court in B.F Goodrich Co. v.
Murtha21 observed, "Only hazardous wastes are subject to the strict
standards of the 'cradle-to-grave' regulatory regime [of subpart C of
RCRA]. '22 The "cradle-to-grave" regime is a very extensive set of regu-
15. W. SHAKEPEAP, KiNG LEAR, act I, scene i.
16. While no exact count of the number of municipalities so protesting can be determined,
it is noteworthy that the moving municipalities in the B.F Goodrich Co. action numbered
twenty-four Connecticut towns, cities, boroughs, or other municipal entities, see B.F. Good-
rich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960, 962 n.3 (D. Conn. 1991), and that the moving parties in
the Transportation Leasing Co. action numbered twenty-eight cities, see Transportation Leas-
ing Co. v. California, No. 89-7368, slip op. at 1-2 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990). These
numbers alone suggest some considerable protest by a number of municipalities over the label-
ling of their MSW as "hazardous." See EPA Interim Policy, supra note 2, at 51,072 (prefatory
section discussing various comments to EPA proposal and noting: "Municipalities and some
States do not believe it is appropriate to include the generators/transporters of municipal
wastes as potentially responsible parties [in CERCLA sites]."). In just one example of the
EPA's prosecutorial discretion, it is reported that in the Charles George dump site in Tyng-
sborough, Massachusetts, the EPA sought to impose the entire amount of some $30 million in
cleanup costs upon only the industrial users of the site, ignoring municipal contributors who
had contributed by volume some 99% of the waste at the site. Ferrey, A Liability Crisis Cities
Can't Throw Away, L.A. Times, Oct. 20, 1986, at B5, col. 2.
17. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907, 6911-6916, 6921-6931, 6941-6949, 6951-
6954, 6961-6964, 6971-6979, 6981-6986 (1988)).
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
19. 1 C. ScHRArr & R. STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 4-3; Ferrey, supra note 4, at 200.
20. Those wastes defined as hazardous under RCRA are listed in 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-
261.33 (1990).
21. 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991).
22. Id at 964 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS 6119, 6120). See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6925 (1988) for
subpart C of RCRA.
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lations which are intended to monitor hazardous wastes from their incep-
tion by a "generator,"23 through their transportation to their ultimate
disposal at treatment, storage and disposal facilities.24
It is in the language of RCRA and its implementing regulations that
municipalities find the greatest solace and support for the argument that
their ever-increasing volume of MSW should not be considered hazard-
ous. Indeed, the regulations explicitly exempt household waste from
RCRA's definition of hazardous wastes.2" In 1984, Congress enacted a
self-proclaimed "clarification" of the scope of this household waste ex-
clusion under RCRA to exempt a resource recovery facility from the
onerous cradle-to-grave regulations of subpart C if that facility: "re-
ceives and burns only-(i) household waste (from single and multiple
dwellings, hotels, motels and other residential sources), and (ii) solid
waste from commercial or industrial sources that does not contain haz-
ardous waste identified or listed under this section."26
This household waste exemption under RCRA has prompted some
municipalities to argue that a similar exemption exists under CERCLA.
The municipalities point to the language of section 9601(14)27 of CER-
CLA as support for their contention that the MSW exemption in RCRA
has been incorporated by reference into CERCLA.28 They argue that,
23. See 1 C. SCHRAFF & R. STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 2-18 ("persons who arrange for
disposal or treatment, or arrange with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment" of
a hazardous substance are liable as a generator under CERCLA). Typically, those arranging
for the disposal or the transporation for disposal of hazardous substances are those companies
or individuals who "generate" the hazardous substances. Id. at 2-18 to 2-20. See EPA In-
terim Policy, supra note 2, at 51,074 n.5 (clarifying scope of 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(3) to include,
among those "beyond true generators," anyone who arranges for disposal).
24. The detailed regulations of subpart C of RCRA are contained in an excruciatingly
complex portion of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 260-265 (1990). The
fine print consumes over 400 pages of the 1990 version of the Code of Federal Regulations.
25. 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b) (1990). This section provides in pertinent part:
(b) Solid wastes which are not hazardous wastes. The following solid wastes are not
hazardous wastes: (1) Household waste, including household waste that has been
collected, transported, stored, treated, disposed, recovered (e.g., refuse-derived fuel)
or reused. "Household waste" means any material (including garbage, trash and
sanitary wastes in septic tanks) derived from households (including single and multi-
ple residences, hotels and motels...
Id.
26. The Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, § 223, 98
Stat. 3221, 3252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6921i (1988)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) defines the term "hazardous substance" as meaning any sub-
stance listed in a number of separate environmental statutes, including: "any hazardous waste
having the characteristics identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act... (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of Congress)." Id (citations omitted).
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because CERCLA expressly incorporates the hazardous waste provisions
of RCRA, it must also impliedly incorporate the exemptions provided by
RCRA.29
In addition to the regulatory exclusion, municipalities also focus on
two policy proclamations of the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) which suggest that MSW should not be deemed "hazard-
ous." First, municipalities point to the EPA Interim Municipal Settle-
ment Policy (EPA Interim Policy). 30 The political nature of the EPA
Interim Policy was made apparent early in the preamble: "The primary
purpose of this interim policy is to provide interim guidance to EPA Re-
gional offices on how they should exercise their enforcement discretion in
dealing with municipalities and municipal wastes in the [CERCLA] set-
tlement process."' 31 Despite acknowledging expressly that MSW "may
fall within the CERCLA liability framework,, 32 the EPA concluded that
its approach would be "to exclude such municipal wastes from the
[CERCLA] settlement process."' 33 The reason for this exclusion is not
clear from the text of the EPA Interim Policy, especially in light of the
EPA's express acknowledgment that MSW may "contain small quanti-
ties of household hazardous wastes."' 34 Thus, the EPA's decision not to
include municipalities in the CERCLA liability process can only be ex-
plained on some other non-legal basis-in this author's view, political
considerations. The EPA's stance on this issue has led municipalities to
29. See, eg., Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf
of the Defendant Municipal/Government Agency Collectors Group at 14 n. 13, B.F. Goodrich
Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991) [hereinafter Municipal Group Mem.] ("since
CERCLA... incorporates into its definition of hazardous substances as those substances
designated as hazardous wastes under RCRA, CERCLA incorporates the entire household
waste exemption."); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for an Or-
der Specifying Issues Without Substantial Controversy at 39-41, Transportation Leasing Co. v.
California, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990) (No. 89-7368) ("the express exclusion of house-
hold waste from the definition of hazardous waste under RCRA compels the conclusion that
household waste should not be considered a 'hazardous substance' under CERCLA.").
30. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (1989).
31. Id. (emphasis added). Because of the case law finding that liability under CERCLA is
both "strict" and "joint and several," many defendants tend to settle rather than litigate their
cases in court. This means that EPA's "settlement" policy is, in fact, a determination of who
pays what share for the clean-up costs in a CERCLA action.
32. Id. at 51,074 ("To the extent municipal wastes contain a hazardous substance that is
covered under section [9601(14)] of CERCLA and there is a release or threatened release, such
municipal wastes may fall within the CERCLA liability framework.").
33. I1d at 51,072. Although the EPA Interim Policy includes municipalities in the initial
information gathering process, it excludes them from "notification of potential liability" for
the mere transportation of MSW. Id. at 51,073. This exclusion would not apply, however, if
the EPA obtained "site-specific information that the [MSW] or sewage sludge contain[ed] a
hazardous substance from a commercial, institutional, or industrial process or activity." Id.
34. Id. at 51,074.
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maintain that, given CERCLA's silence about its coverage of MSW,
courts should adopt the EPA Interim Policy by exempting cities from
CERCLA liability.
35
Second, the EPA, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, has tradi-
tionally avoided naming municipalities as potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) 36 in its CERCLA actions.37 The EPA has never specified its ra-
tionale for this practice. One reason may be an apparent conviction on
the part of the EPA that MSW is not generally hazardous.38 Another
reason may stem from the misconception that industrial entities are more
financially equipped to cope with CERCLA liability than municipalities,
for the EPA will only name those parties "who have the ability to under-
take or pay for response action.
'39
With this background of: (1) an express statutory and regulatory
exclusion of household wastes from the RCRA regulation of hazardous
wastes; and, (2) an EPA policy of generally excluding municipalities
from the Superfund settlement process, the reactions of two district court
judges to the municipal argument that MSW should be excluded from
CERCLA liability are examined.
III. "COME NOT BETWEEN THE DRAGON AND HIS WRATH:" THE
IMPOSITION OF CERCLA's STRICT LIABILITY UPON
MUNICIPALITIES
Just as King Lear warned his noble Kent against intercession on
behalf of fair Cordelia,4 so have two recent United States District Court
cases admonished the EPA to stay out of battles between private party
plaintiffs and municipal defendants in CERCLA actions. Notwithstand-
ing the EPA's reluctance to name municipalities as PRPs in CERLCA
35. See, e.g., Municipal Group Mem., supra note 29, at 32 (arguing that court should defer
to EPA's Interim Policy "[iun light of the silence in the statutory coverage of MSW and the
sparse legislative history on the issue").
36. Potentially Responsible Parties (PRPs) are those persons or entities covered by the
language of the liability provisions of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988) (four
basic categories of covered persons or entities: owners and operators; owners and operators at
time of disposal; those who have arranged for disposal; and transporters).
37. Ferrey, supra note 4, at 220-21 (indicating that in case of Charles George landfill site
EPA failed to name municipalities which contributed 99% of waste by volume to landfill); id
at 252-53 (noting "EPA's prosecutorial habit of naming private, but not municipal, solid waste
generators as PRPs for the cleanup of Superfund sites").
38. See, eg., id. at 256 ("Is MSW a legally hazardous substance? As a matter of
prosecutorial discretion, the EPA uniformly answers this question in the negative in scores of
prosecutions nationwide.").
39. Hickok & Padleschat, Strategic Consideration in Defending and Settling a Superfund
Case, 19 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 1213, 1216 n.16 (1986).
40. W. SHAKESPEARE, supra note 15, act I, scene i.
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actions, both B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha4 1 and Transportation Leasing
Co. v. California 42 require municipalities to take responsibility for gener-
ating MSW or face liability under CERCLA.
A. B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha: A Firm Decision Against
Municipalities
B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha involved two Superfund sites located in
Connecticut: the Beacon Heights and Laurel Park landfills.43 After the
EPA rounded up the "usual suspects"-large industrial concerns such as
B.F. Goodrich Co. (B.F. Goodrich) and Uniroyal Chemical Co. (Uni-
royal)-it negotiated a settlement with them and thirty other companies
to pay an estimated $20 million in cleanup costs.' Before filing a con-
sent decree to memorialize the corporate parties' cleanup agreement,
lawsuits were filed by B.F. Goodrich and Uniroyal against the alleged
owners or operators of the sites, Harold Murtha and various related per-
sons and entities.45 Thereafter, the EPA and the State of Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection filed related lawsuits.46
From this small litigation acorn grew a mighty judicial oak. Murtha
impleaded47 some two hundred third-party defendants, including twenty-
four municipal entities.48 B.F. Goodrich and Uniroyal filed amended
complaints to implead various municipal entities as defendants.
4 9
Shortly after being served with the complaints in both the B.F. Goodrich
41. 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991).
42. No. 89-7368, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
43. Laurel Park was listed by the State of Connecticut as the state's highest priority site for
cleanup, and was listed as the 85th site in EPA's March 1990 National Priorities List (NPL).
40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. B at 122 (1990). Beacon Heights was listed as the 254th site in EPA's
March 1990 NPL. Id at 126. To place these rankings in perspective, the March 1990 NPL
listed a total of 988 sites, exclusive of federal facilities, which were separately listed. Id.
44. Proposed Consent Decree Will Require $20 Million Cleanup of CTLandfill, Hazardous
Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 11,271 (Aug. 3, 1987) (requiring thirty-two companies to clean
up contaminated site, including costs for surface clean up and groundwater monitoring, as well
as repayment to EPA of certain of its costs in investigating the site).
45. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 961.
46. Id at 961 & n.2.; U.S., CT Simultaneously File Cost Recovery Suits Against Owner/
Operators, Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews) 10,613 (Mar. 16, 1987).
47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14. "Impleader under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides a procedural basis for defendants in Superfund cases to seek contribution
from third parties." Hickok & Padleschat, supra note 38, at 1216.
48. RE Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 961-62 & n.3.
49. For example, the group of plaintiffs with the B.F. Goodrich group alone filed an
amended complaint against an additional 388 parties. Id. at 962 & n.5. The United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut organized the parties into various groups, in-
cluding a group labelled the "Municipal Government Agency Collectors Group" (municipali-
ties). Id. at 961.
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and Uniroyal cases, the municipalities moved for summary judgment.5 °
1. The municipal group's summary judgment motion
The twenty-four municipalities in B. Goodrich Co. argued princi-
pally that the generation or collection of MSW does not incur liability
under CERCLA because any such wastes derive from household sources
and, therefore, should be excluded from CERCLA's coverage."' To sup-
port this contention, the municipalities noted that CERCLA is silent
with respect to coverage of MSW.5 2 Given this alleged statutory silence,
the municipalities argued that the court should adopt the EPA Interim
Policy so as to exclude MSW from the ambit of hazardous substances
under CERCLA. 3 The municipalities delicately described the nature of
the EPA Interim Policy, suggesting that the policy created a rebuttable
presumption that MSW is "free of [hazardous substances] to any signifi-
cant extent." 4 Therefore, the municipal group argued, the court should
defer to the EPA interpretation of CERCLA as pronounced in the EPA
Interim Policy and exclude municipalities from CERCLA liability. 5
2. The district court's ruling
The United States District Court Judge, Peter C. Dorsey, denied the
municipal group's summary judgment motion.56 Judge Dorsey wrote a
lengthy slip opinion which will probably serve as the landmark decision
on municipal liability under CERCLA. Judge Dorsey's opinion con-
tained three major points. First, if the municipalities' MSW does contain
certain hazardous substances identified in CERCLA, 7 the municipalities
are subject to CERCLA liability."8 While the court did not elaborate
50. Id. at 962. The B.F. Goodrich plaintiffs served their amended complaint on or about
April 26, 1990, and Uniroyal served its complaint on or about April 27, 1990. Municipal
Group Mem., supra note 29, at 4-5. The motion for summary judgment by the municipalities
is dated May 31, 1990. Id at 1.
51. Municipal Group Mem., supra note 29, at 8-9. To be sure, the motion contained cer-
tain alternate grounds for requesting summary judgment, including the claim that plaintiffs
failed to show that any of the MSW wastes collected contributed to the chemical contamina-
tion at the two sites. Id at 11. This secondary argument, however, focused on the specific
factual allegations, and not a general legal proposition.
52. Id. at 12-21.
53. Id. at 21-22.
54. Id at 24.
55. Id at 32-37.
56. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 974.
57. For definitions of hazardous substances, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988); 40 C.F.R.
§ 302.4(a) (1990).
58. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 964. Municipalities may be liable pursuant to sec-
tion 9607(a)(3) of CERCLA if their MSW contains hazardous substances. See 42 U.S.C.
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upon this point, it is important for one critical reason-it signifies a di-
rect rejection of the municipalities' argument that MSW, by definition,
contains only a de minimis amount of hazardous substances.59 Indeed,
in a subsequent portion of the opinion, Judge Dorsey expressly rejected
the contention that because MSW contains only minimal toxic waste it
should be exempt.'
The municipalities' contention was correctly rejected by the district
court, for various courts had repudiated the de minimis argument long
ago in connection with private party generators.61 The fact that a city,
rather than a private entity, is responsible for sending MSW to a
CERCLA site should make no difference in terms of assessing the haz-
ardous composition of MSW. Even if a municipality could convince a
court that its MSW contains only a minimal amount of hazardous sub-
stances, it is still liable under CERCLA because "liability under
CERCLA attaches regardless of the concentration of the hazardous sub-
stances present in a defendant's waste."62 Moreover, Judge Dorsey
noted that the courts can apportion damages between the various munici-
pal and industrial defendants to avoid "absurd results. 63 Presumably,
what Judge Dorsey meant to suggest by this statement was that the court
§ 9607(a)(3) (1988). This section provides for what is commonly referred to as "generator
liability" for the selection or contractual arrangement for the disposal of hazardous substances.
1 C. SCHRAF1 & R. STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 1-25 ("The intent of Section 9607(a)(3) is to
impose liability upon 'generators' of hazardous substances.").
Section 9607 of CERCLA provides in pertinent part:
[A]ny person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and...
[A]ny person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence or
response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for... all costs of removal.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), (4).
59. The municipalities had argued that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut the presumption
that their MSW contained at most de minimis amounts of hazardous substances. Municipal
Group Mem., supra note 29, at 37.
60. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 966 (citing United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp.
1327, 1340 (E.D. Pa. 1983)).
61. See, eg., United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp.
984, 992 (D.S.C. 1984) (rejecting argument by generator defendants that would require plain-
tiff to prove that hazardous substances traceable to each generator were more than de minimis
factors in release of such substances); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1332-33 (ED.
Pa. 1983) (rejecting generator argument that CERCLA plaintiff must show that generator
defendant's particular wastes caused government to incur response costs).
62. City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 744 F. Supp. 474, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
63. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 966.
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could consider that a municipality might be allocated a much smaller
dollar share of the ultimate clean-up costs than an industrial generator
which sent a much higher percentage of hazardous substances to the
site.64
The B.F. Goodrich Co. court then reviewed in some detail the mu-
nicipalities' claim that RCRA's exemption for household waste should be
incorporated by reference when assessing CERCLA liability.65 Initially,
the court noted that other courts have refused to extend the RCRA
household waste exclusion to materials regulated as "hazardous" under
other statutes.66 Using similar logic, the B.F. Goodrich court rejected the
municipalities' argument that the RCRA exemption for household waste
implies a similar exemption under CERCLA.67 In fact, Judge Dorsey
found persuasive that Congress, when enacting CERCLA, decided not to
expressly exclude household waste from CERCLA's scope.6 As the
court observed, Congress was well aware of the RCRA exclusion for
household waste when it enacted CERCLA, yet deliberately chose not to
make a similar exclusion under CERCLA.69 Thus, rather than bolster-
ing the municipalities' argument, Judge Dorsey decided that Congress'
silence on the exemption issue weighed against finding an exclusion for
MSW under CERCLA.
Furthermore, the B.F. Goodrich Co. court determined that house-
hold waste under RCRA is not necessarily synonymous with MSW.7 °
To support this finding, the court credited the affidavit by the plaintiff's
expert, Kirk W. Brown, Ph.D.71 Dr. Brown indicated that, based upon
various EPA surveys and his own knowledge, MSW usually contains
hazardous substances in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 percent by volume. 2 The
court further undercut the municipalities' argument by noting that the
EPA Interim Policy states that "the actual composition of such wastes
varies considerably at individual sites . . . .7I Thus, the district court
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1) (1988) (providing for de minimis settlements with parties
that send minimal amounts of hazardous substances to sites when effect of those hazardous
substances is minimal in comparison to other hazardous substances at site).
65. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 964-65.
66. Id. at 965; see, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Idaho v. Hanna Mine Co., 699 F. Supp. 827, 833 (D. Idaho 1987), affd, 882 F.2d 392(9th Cir.
1989).
67. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp at 965-66.
68. Id at 965.
69. Id
70. Id at 966.
71. Id. at 972.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 966 (quoting EPA Interim Municipal Settlement Policy, 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071,
51,074 (1989)).
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firmly rejected the municipalities' argument that the RCRA exemption
for "household waste" implied an exemption for MSW under CERCLA.
Third, the B.F. Goodrich court considered the EPA Interim Policy
and its impact on CERCLA liability for municipalities.74 In evaluating
the EPA Interim Policy, the court had an additional advantage-a brief
filed in connection with the motion by the United States Department of
Justice, Environmental Enforcement Division (DOJ)." The DOJ brief
contained a slightly more expansive statement of its position on MSW.
First, the DOJ argued explicitly that the definition of a hazardous sub-
stance under CERCLA bears no relation to the type of source which
creates the waste. 76 As the DOJ noted:
[CERCLA] Section 101(14) makes no distinction regarding the
source of the substance. If the material at issue is listed as haz-
ardous in a statute referred to in Section 101(14), it is a "haz-
ardous substance" under CERCLA regardless of whether it
came from an industrial, commercial, institutional, municipal
77or household source ....
Moreover, the DOJ virtually repudiated the value of the EPA Interim
Policy by informing the district court that "[t]he [EPA Interim Policy]
has no binding impact on EPA, PRPs or the Court. The policy is not a
rule or regulation, and cannot be relied on as the basis for a claim or a
defense."'78 With this position taken by the DOJ, the district court had
no difficulty in ignoring the Interim Policy. The court characterized the
74. Id. at 965-66.
75. Opposition of the United States Department of Justice to the Motion for Summary
Judgment Filed on Behalf of the Municipal Defendants, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F.
Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991) [hereinafter U.S. Opp. Mem.]. The EPA, represented by the De-
partment of Justice (DOJ), was a party to the initial lawsuit against B.F. Goodrich Co. and
other industrial generators, which resulted in a consent decree for the clean-up work to be
performed. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. After B.F. Goodrich Co. impleaded the
municipalities, the DOJ filed a brief entitled Opposition of the United States to the Motion for
Summary Judgment Filed on Behalf of the Municipal Defendants, which is actually more in
the nature of an amicus brief than that of a party affected by the municipalities' summary
judgment motion. See U.S. Opp. Mem., supra.
76. U.S. Opp. Mem., supra note 75, at 11.
77. Ia
78. Id at 22. One may wonder why the EPA Interim Policy was published in the Federal
Register if it was truly not binding upon any of the relevant parties. Whatever inconsistency
exists between the EPA Interim Policy as announced in the Federal Register and the DOJ's
apparent lack of willingness to support that policy in formal briefs filed with district courts, it
seems clear that, in the future, municipalities cannot rely upon the federal government for any
real support in their efforts to escape CERCLA liability. Indeed, in another recent opinion a
district court cited a DOJ brief as stating that: "EPA expressly denies that it follows a policy
of refusing to enforce CERCLA against municipal generators or transporters of waste."
United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 433 (D.N.J. 1991).
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Interim Policy as merely "a guide to EPA employees in administering
the Superfund and reflects EPA priorities.... It does not limit a private
party's claims."
79
In sum, the district court in RE Goodrich Co. held that municipali-
ties can, in fact, be held liable under CERCLA for their disposal or ar-
ranged disposal of hazardous substances at landfill sites."0 Consequently,
based upon its earlier finding that MSW can be a hazardous substance,
the court held that there was a genuine dispute of material fact sufficient
to deny the municipalities' motion for summary judgment on the factual
defenses to the amended complaints."1
B. Transportation Leasing Co. v. California: Confirming that
Municipalities Can Face CERCLA Liability for Their MSW
In Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, 2 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California faced claims involving
the Operating Industries, Inc. (Operating Industries) landfill site.83 Op-
erating Industries is a site of approximately 190 acres located in Mon-
terey Park, California and is listed on the EPA's National Priorities List
as the seventy-sixth site out of over nine hundred. 4 According to the
EPA, the site operated from 1948 through 1984, during which period it
accepted "industrial solid, liquid and hazardous wastes and municipal
trash."8 " The EPA has named as PRPs at the site some 181 private cor-
porations, and in the first partial settlement decree entered in 1988 ob-
tained millions of dollars from these parties for certain remedial work. 6
In late 1989, sixty-four private PRPs, who were part of the group of
corporations that had previously settled with the EPA, filed a lawsuit
against a number of municipalities in Southern California who allegedly
contributed hazardous substances in the form of MSW to the Operating
79. B.F. Goodrich Co., 754 F. Supp. at 967.
80. Id. at 973-74.
81. Ia
82. No. 89-7386, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
83. Id at 3.
84. 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 app. B. at 122 (1990).
85. Partial Consent Decree, United States v. Chevron Chem. Co., No. 88-7186, slip op. at
para. IV(A) (C.D. Cal. May 11, 1989).
86. Id. at attachment C. The remedial work done under the first Consent Decree included
providing a treatment process for leachate-liquid or water soluble substances that migrate
from the original point source-at the site and also providing for certain measures to stabilize
the ground around the site. Id. at para. IX(B). The private parties included in the Consent
Decree agreed to perform the work, or alternatively, to pay cash to help pay for the remedial
work up to a maximum of $34 million. Id at para. IX(C).
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Industries site.87
In September 1990, the municipalities filed a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment based on two arguments. First, the municipalities as-
serted that: (1) they could not be liable as persons who arranged for the
disposal of hazardous wastes because they "merely licensed" independ-
ent waste haulers to conduct business; and, (2) even if they were deemed
to have arranged for the disposal, the "rubbish" generated by the resi-
dences and businesses within the municipalities could not be a "hazard-
ous substance" within the meaning of CERCLA, at least "absent specific
evidence that the particular rubbish generated contained CERCLA de-
fined hazardous substances." 8 The municipalities' second argument, as
in B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 9 was that because Congress expressly
exempted household waste from its definition of hazardous waste in
RCRA, this exemption should impliedly be incorporated in CERCLA.9 °
In opposition, the sixty-four industrial parties maintained that the
exemption under RCRA for household waste did not indicate that Con-
gress intended to exclude household waste from CERCLA, a completely
different statutory scheme.9" Certain plaintiffs also cited a 1988 EPA
directive issued by the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
9 2
which stated, "CERCLA does not contain an exclusion from liability for
household waste or an exclusion based on the amount of waste gener-
ated.... If a household waste contains a substance that is covered under
these CERCLA sections (whether or not it is a RCRA hazardous waste),
87. See Court Docket, Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec.
5, 1990) (No. 89-7368) (indicating complaint filed on December 21, 1989). The municipalities
sued included Alhambra, Artesia, Baldwin Park, Bell, Bell Gardens, Beverly Hills, Commerce,
Compton, Cdahy, El Monte, Huntington Park, Industry, La Puente, Lynwood, Maywood,
Montebello, Monterey Park, Norwalk, Paramount, Rosemead, San Gabriel, San Marino,
Santa Fe Springs, Sierra Madre, South El Monte, South Gate, South Pasadena, Temple City
and Walnut. Id. The County of Los Angeles and the State of California were also named as
parties. Id.
88. Notice of Motion and Motion for an Order Specifying Issues Without Substantial Con-
troversy; Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Declarations of Frank Ruiz and Frank
M. Usher in Support Thereof at 2-3, Transportation Leasing Co. v. California, slip op. (C.D.
Cal. Dec. 5, 1990) (No. 89-7368) [hereinafter Municipalities Mem.] (filed Sept. 11, 1990).
While the moving papers requested a motion in the style of a state court specification of issues
without substantial controversy, it clearly was a motion for partial summary judgment pursu-
ant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
89. 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991).
90. For a discussion of the B.F. Goodrich Co. court's treatment of this argument, see supra
notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
91. Transportation Leasing Co., No. 89-7368, slip op. at 4.
92. See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE (OSWER), U.S. EPA DI-
RECTIVE No. 9574.00-I, CLARIFICATION OF ISSUES PERTAINING TO HOUSEHOLD HAZARD-
OUS WASTE COLLECTION PROGRAMS (1988) [hereinafter OSWER DIRECTIVE].
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potential CERCLA liability exists."93
Judge William Matthew Byrne, Jr. denied the municipalities' mo-
tion in short order. Judge Byrne characterized as "without merit" the
municipalities' argument that the definition of hazardous substances
under CERCLA excludes household waste.94 The court reasoned that
merely because RCRA contains an exemption for household wastes, "it
does not necessarily follow that the RCRA exclusion for household
waste compels the conclusion that household waste cannot be a 'hazard-
ous substance' under Section 101(14) of CERCLA."95 Consequently, the
court denied the municipalities' motion for summary judgment.96
IV. MUNICIPALITIES AND CERCLA LIABILITY: ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES TO THE STRICT LIABILITY DRAGON
Though the district court order in Transportation Leasing Co. v.
California9 7 is less detailed than the opinion in RE. Goodrich Co. v. Mur-
tha,9" the bottom line in both cases is remarkably similar. Municipalities
now face the ominous possibility of joint and several liability under CER-
CLA for their disposal of MSW. Both decisions rest on well-founded
interpretations of CERCLA. Indeed, the EPA's Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response directive reached the same conclusion:
CERCLA does not contain an exclusion from liability for
household waste or an exclusion based on the amount of waste
generated.... Communities should recognize that potential
liability under CERCLA applies regardless of whether the
HHW [Household Hazardous Waste] was picked up as part of
a community's routine waste collection service and disposed of
in a municipal waste landfill .... 99
Thus, given the statutory language of CERCLA, the federal courts'
broad interpretation of CERCLA as a "remedial statute, ' '"" ° and the
EPA's administrative interpretations supporting application of
93. Id. at 4.
94. Transportation Leasing Co., No. 89-7368, slip op. at 3.
95. Id. at 3-4.
96. Id. at 5.
97. No. 89-7368, slip op. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 1990).
98. 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991).
99. OSWER DIRECTIVE, supra note 92, at 4.
100. See, e.g., United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 26 (1st Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 957 (1991). The Kayser-Roth Corp. court explained, "Because CERCLA is
a remedial statute, we... construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial
legislative purpose. With this in mind, we join the Second Circuit in proclaiming that 'we will
not interpret section 9607(a) in any way that apparently frustrates the statute's goals.'" Id
(quoting New York v. Shore Realty, 759 F.2d 1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985)).
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CERCLA liability to MSW, municipalities now face several critical
choices.
Despite the pained protests of wherefore and why by various munic-
ipalities, the recent decisions in B.F Goodrich Co. and Transportation
Leasing confirm what many others have long argued: municipalities
should face the dragon of federal environmental liability laws, CERCLA,
for the mere shipment of MSW to Superfund sites.101 Of course, such
increased recognition of potentially very burdensome liability puts cities
in an awkward dilemma. Certain cities experiencing continuous and
largely uncontrolled growth also experience the ever-increasing genera-
tion and shipment of MSW to landfills. As a result, such cities may face
the potentially crushing liability imposed by CERCLA.1°2 In turn, the
prospect of ceaseless generation of MSW and the resulting potential lia-
bility creates a strong impetus to limit growth. Thus, municipal decision-
makers may attempt to avoid CERCLA liability for dumping MSW by
limiting development approvals until the development projects can han-
dle not just additional parking, lighting, and landscaping, but also waste
generation problems. The following sections describe and critique vari-
ous proposals put forth for handling this new-found municipal liability.
A. Surrendering to the Dragon: Continuing Along the Same Old Path
of "Sanitary" Landfill Disposal
First, municipalities could continue in the tradition of simply col-
lecting increasing amounts of MSW and disposing of it in "sanitary"
landfills, thereby ignoring the possibly devastating effects of dumping the
101. See, eg., Ferrey, supra note 4, at 271 ("In view of the EPA's position in other cases,
and in view of the contrary judicial determinations of this issue, the EPA's exemption for
MSW [from CERCLA liability] is legally inconsistent.... MSW should be routinely included
in Superfund prosecutions, under any one of several legal authorities."); Wright, supra note 9,
at 8 ("The liability to the City of Springfield [Missouri] or any other city as the owner/opera-
tor of a landfill for the release or potential release of a hazardous substance into the environ-
ment is absolute and without regard to fault.").
102. One alternative to landfllling might be greater reliance on recycling and "waste-to-
energy" facilities. But as William L. Kovacs has noted, economic considerations and neigh-
borhood fears tilt the scales strongly against "waste-to-energy" facilities in favor of landfills.
Kovacs, supra note 3, at 540-41. Moreover, although Kovacs urges more recycling, he admits
that states face what he terms a "Herculean task" in developing increased recycling. Id. at
545; cf. Texas Calls Halt to Waste-Disposal Sites, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1991, at A12, col. 1
(describing Texas state-wide moratorium on permits for waste sites). Even the recycling of
MSW poses some potential health concerns. See Notice of Meeting on Potential Hazards of
Municipal Solid Waste Recycling, 56 Fed. Reg. 6849, 6849 (1991) ("Recycling of emissions
from municipal solid waste (MSW) has become a matter of great public interest. However, the
potential emissions and risk to health and the environment of many recycling processes are as
yet unexplored."). Thus, the panacea of recycling poses additional problems in connection
with MSW.
1198 [Vol. 24:1183
MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE AND CERCLA
potentially hazardous ingredients. This choice would seem to be ulti-
mate folly because it ignores both the ever-growing volume of MSW and,
more importantly, the increasing cost of disposing of such waste. Even
the costs of litigation in facilitating the clean up of CERCLA sites can
impose substantial additional costs upon the smaller municipal
budget. 103
B. Taming the Dragon: Imposing a Negligence Standard for
Municipal Liability
A second alternative is essentially a variation on the first option.
Municipalities could continue to dispose of their MSW while seeking leg-
islative relief from the strict liability provisions of CERCLA and its sister
state statutes.1l 4 One such legislative proposal was recently offered by
New Jersey Governor James Florio. 05 He argued that imposition of
strict liability upon municipalities under either CERCLA or the analo-
gous New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act l°6 was too se-
vere.'" 7 He proposed legislative reform to impose only a negligence
standard on municipalities involved in Superfund sites.108
The alternative of modifying the liability standard for municipalities
lacks viability for several reasons. First, it would allow municipalities to
continue on in the traditional pattern of unchecked growth of municipal
waste without any real liability limitations. Second, even if a negligence
standard were adopted, such a standard, in practice, would not serve to
limit the potential liability of many municipalities. In the real world mu-
nicipalities, just like their industrial counterparts of twenty years ago,
103. See Wright, supra note 9, at 9 (noting litigation costs in the millions of dollars). While
the actual litigation bills incurred by municipalities in CERCLA actions are unavailable, the
author is personally aware that bills for private industrial parties in major CERCLA actions
can run over $1 million per year.
104. Many states have adopted state statutes that parallel the federal CERCLA statute.
See, eg., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25300-25395 (West 1983 & Supp. 1990); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22a-133a to -133f (West Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21E,
§§ 1-18 (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to -23.11z (West 1982 & Supp.
1990); see also 1 C. SCHRAFF & R. STEINBERG, supra note 9, at 12-16 to 12-18 (description of
state superfund laws).
105. Florio, Too-Strict Liability: Making Local Government Entities Pay for Waste Disposal
Site Cleanup, 1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 105, 119-21 (1990).
106. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:10-23.11 to 23.11z.
107. Florio, supra note 105, at 117-19.
108. Id. at 120-21. Governor Florio argues that the New Jersey statute should be modified
to provide that "[t]hose who have merely handled or disposed of this [municipal] hazardous
waste out of public necessity, such as municipalities and counties, are to be held liable only if
plaintiffs can demonstrate that the handling or disposal activities were carried out negligently."
Id. at 120.
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have done little or nothing to ensure the adequacy and environmental
security of local landfills.109 Such indifference would surely fall below
the standard of reasonable care in the eyes of judges evaluating actions
with 1991 hindsight.
Third, Governor Florio's proposal would create an untenable dis-
tinction between municipalities and their industrial counterparts, thereby
leading to an inequitable legal burden. Industrial users would be subject
to CERCLA's strict liability standard, while municipalities would be
subject to the less stringent standard of negligence. Governor Florio's
proposal is premised upon an artificial distinction between parties he de-
scribes as "in a position to profit from the generation or transport of
hazardous waste" and those whom the governor posits as merely han-
dling or disposing of such materials.110 Governor Florio ignores the real-
ity that major corporations simply do not profit from generation of
hazardous waste materials but, rather, are subject to strict regulatory
costs in the generation and disposal of such materials.111
Furthermore, Governor Florio blithely attempts to justify a differen-
tial standard based upon the undocumented assertion that "a large mul-
tinational industrial enterprise would be able to incorporate the
remediation costs into the price of its products on an international ba-
sis." '12 This assertion, however, is not at all certain to be correct. Even
large multinational corporations face foreign competition which may
limit their ability to raise prices on their products. 1 3 Additionally, many
industrial contributors to CERCLA sites across the country are local
companies with low profit margins, not the large multinational which
Governor Florio conveniently posits.1
14
Finally, Governor Florio's proposed differential standard is pre-
109. See Ferrey, supra note 4, at 212-13 (noting that 20% of NPL sites are or were MSW
disposal facilities and that the Office of Technology Assessment "expects that half the future
Superfund priority sites will be municipal landfills"); Florio, supra note 105, at 109-10
(describing site used by Gloucester Township, New Jersey as located adjacent to residential
developments and motorbike recreation area, and above aquifer providing municipal water
supply).
110. Florio, supra note 105, at 120.
111. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
112. Florio, supra note 105, at 119.
113. See Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J.
499, 522-23 (1961) (describing difficulty of enterprise to shift costs when exit costs were diffi-
cult and economy was in general state of decline, and noting that ability to spread costs de-
pends on degree of competition between selected industry and other industrial concerns).
114. For example, Edgington Oil Co., ranked 59th on the listing of private party generators
for the very expensive Operating Industries Superfund site, is in financial straits. See L.A.
Times, Feb. 8, 1991, at D2, col. I ("Most of [Edgington Oil's] estimated 75 employees were
sent home from work Wednesday, after the company said it could not meet its payroll. Edg-
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mised upon the misconception that, while private industry can withdraw
from waste-generating businesses, municipalities cannot make such a
choice. 115 On the contrary, a majority of companies face an inevitable
fact of life: certain industrial processes inevitably will create some
amount of hazardous waste materials. Governor Florio cannot be
serious in suggesting that chemical, oil and steel manufacturers have an
option to cease operations. Finally, Governor Florio's proposal ignores
the incentive feature of a strict liability regime upon recalcitrant
municipalities.
116
C. Facing the Dragon: A Proposal for Recycling
The best alternative to the difficult dilemma that municipalities face
by shipping MSW to CERCLA sites is not to modify the current liability
standard. Rather, municipalities, just like their corporate brethren,
should be compelled to face the dragon of strict liability under
CERCLA. Only then will municipalities have the needed incentive to
reexamine the convenient yet environmentally harmful practice of
landfilling MSW.
To combat CERCLA's looming liability, municipalities across the
nation should consider altering their residents' past pattern of simply cre-
ating ton upon ton of MSW, and their own pattern of dumping all this
waste in local landfills. California's Integrated Waste Management Act
of 1989 (IWMA) 117 is an example of one such effort. This act expressly
acknowledges that "[i]n 1988, Californians disposed of over 38 million
tons of solid waste .... This amounts to more than 1,500 pounds of
waste per person living in the state."11 The IWMA notes that over 90%
of California's solid waste is deposited in landfills.11 9 It attempts to re-
spond to diminishing landfill space by requiring that cities and counties
begin a system to reduce the volume of solid waste sent to landfills
through a combination of measures such as source reduction, recycling,
ington is looking to refinance its debts. The company's 50% owner, Clark Oil Trading Co., is
no longer providing financing.").
115. Florio, supra note 105, at 121.
116. The author apologizes to the many municipalities which have directly, and with sub-
stantial effort, dealt with the problem of municipal landfills. The author is aware of substantial
efforts by the City of Jacksonville, Florida, in attempting to examine and review the many
landfill sites used by that municipality. Nonetheless, many other municipalities, such as those
in B.F. Goodrich Co. and Transportation Leasing, simply seem unwilling to face potential lia-
bility under CERCLA.
117. CAL. Pun. REs. CODE §§ 40000-50002 (West Supp. 1991).
118. Id. § 40000(a) (legislative findings concerning need for integrated waste management
plan).
119. Id. § 40000(b).
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and composting activities. 120
There is some indication that California's IWMA is altering both
municipal treatment of MSW and individual residents' waste disposal
habits. For example, "some cities report that 5% to 20% of residential
garbage that used to wind up in landfills is being recycled." 121 Likewise,
individuals are contributing to the effort to reduce landfill waste, such
that "recycling rates for glass, cans, steel and plastic-the pace at which
people convert trash to cash-[have] jumped from 56% in 1989 to 70%
in 1990."122
As with any major municipal undertaking there are, of course, cer-
tain initial challenges to grapple with. Primarily, launching a municipal
recycling program is an expensive proposition. 123 Equipment, such as
curbside bins and trucks, will have to be incorporated into municipal
budgets. Moreover, city planners will be forced to assess, logistically and
demographically, how best to implement recycling in their communities.
This may not be an easy task, given that "'most cities.., aren't in the
business of designing innovative waste management programs.' ,124
While the ultimate goals of the IWMA may or may not be attained,
recycling represents an option which is environmentally preferable to
either of the other proposed alternatives. Certainly recycling must be
better than the old approach of simply pouring ever greater volumes of
waste into sanitary landfills, because that approach has been tried and
failed. It is also better than Governor Florio's proposal to reduce the
liability standard for municipalities, for his proposal would lessen any
incentive municipalities might have to switch from the current landfill
system. Recycling programs, such as those imposed by the IWMA,
would reduce the future liability exposure of municipalities for the waste
they generate today. Additionally, recycling represents a more creative
alternative for dealing with the ever-increasing volume of MSW.
V. CONCLUSION
In describing a certain desolate stretch of ground between the fash-
120. Id. § 40051. The Act mandates an initial reduction in total volume of solid waste sent
to landfills or transformation facilities of 25% by 1995, and a further reduction of 50% of all
solid waste by 2000. Id. § 41780(a)(1)(2).
121. Cone, supra note 5, at B4, col. 1.
122. Id at B1, col. 5.
123. One estimate is that municipal recycling programs will run in the multimillion dollar
range for each city. Id. at B4, col. 1.
124. Id. (quoting Mary Nichols, senior attorney with the Los Angeles office of the Natural
Resources Defense Council).
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ionable Long Island estates and New York City, F. Scott Fitzgerald
wrote of
[A] valley of ashes-a fantastic farm where ashes grow like
wheat into ridges and hills and grotesque gardens; where ashes
take the forms of houses and chimneys and rising smoke and,
finally, with a transcendent effort, of ash-gray men who move
dimly and already crumbling through the powdery air.
125
It is this potential of endless gray valleys of municipal waste which
threatens the picture of limitless growth by wealthy and careless Ameri-
cans. The old solution-simply throwing out everything and letting the
city take it to a "sanitary" landfill-has resulted in innumerable munici-
pal waste sites that have achieved the ultimate regulatory stamp of hor-
ror: the National Priorities List of CERCLA.
Americans, and the cities in which they dwell, must now face the
CERCLA dragon and come up with alternatives. They must either limit
their growth and their waste output, or face vast liability for the waste
that they carelessly leave behind. American cities, unlike Tom and Daisy
Buchanan, do not have the alternative of retreating to some wealthy is-
land while leaving behind the valleys of waste landfills that they created.
125. F. Scorr FITZGERALD, supra note 1, at 25.
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